CALIFORNIA'S URGING TO RIOT LAW
On July 7, 1966, the California Legislature added to the Penal
Code section 404.61 proscribing urging to riot. Ostensibly, the new
section is intended to create a first line of defense against riots. It is
meant to be an aggressive measure, designed to prevent the eruption
of physical force or violence. It should be contrasted to the more
restricted method of control, which goes into effect only after physical
force or violence has erupted, or after a threat of such force or violence, accompanied by immediate power of execution. Section 4042
of the Penal Code, which defines riot, embodies this more restricted
method of control'.
Section 404.6 permits the arrest and prosecution of every person
who, by his acts or conduct, intends to cause a riot under circumstances where the probabilities that he will succeed are imminent.
By allowing the police to arrest such a person or persons, the section
intends to nip the riot-rose in the bud and thereby preserve the public
peace.
The purpose of this note is threefold. First, the factors which led to
the enactment of section 404.6 will be discussed to provide a background for the new section, and to illustrate t6 the reader that section 404.6 was intended to be used in situations where passions are
aroused and where tension is 'so great that the circumstances are
considered explosive in nature. Examples of such situations are the
public disorders in the Watts district of Los Angeles during midAugust, 1965, and in the Hunters Point-Bayview'and Fillmore districts of San Francisco during late Septemb&r, 1966. Second, section
404.6 will be viewed in the light of laws relating to the preservation
of the public peace which existed 'prior to the enactment of section
404.6. Two preexisting sections of the Penal Code will be examined
1 CAL. P r. CODE § 404.6 provides:

Every person who with the intent to cause a riot does an act or engages in
conduct which urges a riot, or urges others to commit acts of force or violence, or the burning or destroying of property, and at a time and place and
under circumstances which produce a clear and present and immediate danger
of acts of force or violence or the burning or destroying of property, is guilty
of a misdemeanor.

This section shall not apply to, nor in any way affect, restrain, or interfere
with, otherwise lawful activity engaged in by or on behalf of a labor organization or organizations by its members, agents or employees.
(Cal. Stat. 1966, 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 166, § 1, at -, urgency, efA. July 20, 1966.)
2 CAL. PEN. CODE § 404, "Riot," defined in text infra, at 11. The Law Relating to
the Preservation of the Public Peace Prior to the Enactment of Section 404.6, A.
Section 404-Riot.
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in detail to point out their adequacies or inadequacies as compared
with the provisions of section 404.6. Two additional Penal Code
sections will be cited to represent the law in the general area relating
to the preservation of the public peace. Third, section 404.6 will be
broken down into its elements, each of which will be analyzed in
order to determine why that element was inserted, and what effect it
will have on the section as a whole.
I. FACTORS LEADING TO ENACTMENT OF THE
UIGING TO R IOT STATUTE

A. The Riots in the Watts District of Los Angeles
The most important factor or event was the eruption of violence
and destruction, which lasted for 144 hours, in the predominantly
Negro Watts district of Los Angeles on August 11, 1965. The
incident which ignited the rioting was the arrest of a drunken Negro
youth whose dangerous driving prompted another Negro to complain
to a Caucasian motorcycle officer who made the arrest. During the
course of the rioting 34 persons were killed,8 1,032 were hurt or
injured,4 and property damage approximated $40,000,000.1 Subsequently, 3,952 persons were arrested. 6 The riots shattered the general belief in Los Angeles that the problems which had caused rioting
in other cities throughout the United States were not acute in Los
Angeles.
A "statistical portrait" drawn in 1964 by the Urban League which

rated American citie- in terms of ten basic aspects of Negro lifesuch as housing, employment, income-anked Los Angeles first
among the sixty-eight cities that were examined. ("There is no
question about it, this is the best city. in the world," a young Negro
leader told us with respect to housing for Negroes.) 7

The question "Then why Los Angeles?" demanded an answer.
B. The Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots
Within a week after the Watts riots had subsided, Governor
Edmund G. Brown appointed a commission "to make an objective
8 Violence in the City-An End or a Beginning? Report of the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, p. 1 (December 2, 1965) (commonly known as "The
McCone Commission Report" and hereinafter cited as McCone).
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7

Id. at 3.
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and dispassionate study of the Los Angeles riots ... ," charging it
with the responsibility of making constructive recommendations.
First, I believe that the Commission should prepare an accurate
chronology and description of the riots and attempt to draw any
lessons which may be learned from a retrospective study of these
events. The purpose of this would not be to fix blame or find
scapegoats, but rather to develop a comprehensive and detailed
Second, I
chronology and description of the disorders ....
believe that the Commission should probe deeply the immediate
and underlying causes of the riots . .. Third, the Commission
should develop recommendations for action designed to prevent a
recurrence of these tragic disorders. The Commission should consider what additional can be done at any level of government or
by any agency of the government to prevent a recurrence. Of equal
importance, the Commission should consider whether there are
steps which private citizens may take, individually or jointly, to
prevent a repetition of the bloodshed.9
Three months later the Commission submitted its report to Governor Brown. Sixty-four meetings had been held during which time
the Commission had received testimony and statements from administrators, law enforcement officers, government employees at the
city, county, and state levels, residents of the riot-torn areas, leaders
of minority groups, representatives from business and labor, and
reports prepared by government agencies, universities, and private
institutions.
C. The Unresolved Problems and Fear of Future Violence
The Commission found that the riots could be attributed to no
single cause or circumstance, but that three fundamental issues 0 in
the urban problems of disadvantaged minorities existed: employment,
education, and police-community relations. After making several
constructive recommendations,"1 the Commission concluded by emphasizing the need for leadership.
Yet to do all these things [i.e., implement the Commission's recom8 Id. at i.
9 Id. at i-iii.
10 Id. at 86.
11 Some of the Commission's recommendations were: (1) improve police-community
relations; (2) develop job training and placement centers; (3) reduce class size in
elementary and junior high schools and employ special personnel; (4) improve transportation throughout the Ios Angeles metropolitan area; (5) construct new hospital
and improve medical programs; (6) liberalize credit and area requirements for FHAinsured loans; (7) exercise of constructive leadership by government, business and
labor, news media, and Negroes themselves. Id. at 37, 47-48, 60-61, 67-68, 74, 80-86.
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mendations] and spend the sums involved will all be for naught
unless the conscience of the community, the white and the Negro
community together, directs a new and, we believe, revolutionary
attitude towards the problem of our city .... The time for bitter
recrimination is past. It must be replaced by thoughtful efforts on
the part of all to solve the12 deepening problems that threaten the
foundations of our society.
Although Governor Brown had specifically charged the Com-

mission to "develop recommendations for action designed to prevent
a recurrence of these tragic disorders,"'1 3 it did not recommend any
penal legislation creating new crimes against the public peace. However, the Commission was aware that the existing breach between the
"advantaged" and "disadvantaged" segments of the community was
so serious and potentially explosive that "unless it is checked, the
August riots may seem by comparison to be only a curtain-raiser for
what could blow up one day in the future."' 4
Apprised of the Commission's warning, and realizing that the
myriad problems responsible for igniting the Watts riots had not
been eradicated, the California Legislature enacted several Penal
Code sections that made unlawful certain conduct inimical to the
public peace. For example, section 241, as amended, makes it a
felony to assault a peace officer or fireman who is in the performance
of his duties; section 452 prohibits the unauthorized possession,
manufacture, and disposition of a fire bomb. Finally, section 404.6,
the subject of this note, makes "urging to riot" a misdemeanor. The
this section an urgency measure, to take effect
legislature labeled
5
immediately.'
The Watts riots, the unresolved problems, and the fear that riots
might again erupt were the factors leading to the enactment of section 404.6. Through the testimony gathered by the Governor's ComId. at 82-83.
Is Id. at iii. See part of Governor's third charge note 9 supra.
14 Id. at 7-8.
15 This act is an urgency measure necessary for the immediate preservation of
the public peace, health or safety within the meaning of Artide IV of the
Constitution and shall go into immediate effect. The facts constituting such
necessity are:
History and statistics indicate that the incidence of conduct proscribed by
this act tends to increase during the months of the summer. The current extraordinary session of the Legislature has been protracted, to the extent that
its adjournment is likely to occur during these months, and the ordinary effective date of this act is thereby deferred beyond the summer. In order that this
act will be available to local law enforcement authorities at the appropriate
time of year, it is necessary that this act go into effect immediately.
(Cal. Stat. 1966, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 166, § 2, at -, urgency, eff. July 20, 1966.)
12
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mission the causes of the riots were explored and articulated. Unresolved problems, and fear of future riots focused attention not only
on the means by which the causes could be eradicated, but also on
the police powers of the state which could be invoked to assure the
preservation of the public peace.
II. THE LAW RELATING TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE
PUBLIC PEACE PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF

SECTION 404.6
The high number of arrests16 made during the Watts riots is some
evidence of the applicability of several preexisting Penal Code secions. The scope of this note does not permit an examination of each
of these sections,' 7 but four sections, three of which were invoked
against the Watts rioters,' 8 are worthy of consideration, for they provide a convenient vehicle for comparative analysis. While sections
404 and 406 will be compared with section 404.6, a discussion of
sections 407 and 409 will elucidate the general boundaries of the law
in this area prior to the enactment of section 404.6. An analysis of
the preexisting Penal Code sections gives rise to the question of
whether those sections were adequate to preserve the public peace,
or whether they were so inadequate as to necessitate the adoption of
section 404.6.
A. Section 404-Riot

Section 404 provides that, "Any use of force or violence, disturbing
the public peace, or any threat to use such force or violence, if accompanied by immediate power of execution, by two or more persons
acting together, and without authority of law is a riot." This section
makes unlawful not only the use of force or violence, but also any
threat to use such force or violence. In People v. Dunn, the Fourth
Appellate District Court affirmed a conviction of riot upon the find16 McCone, supra note 3, at 1.

17 A riot of the Watts magnitude, for example, would include offenses too numerous
to be discussed here. A few of the Penal Code sections invoked against Watts rioters
were: § 69 (Resisting officers); § 404 (Riot); § 407 (Unlawful assembly); § 409
(Riot, rout, or unlawful assembly; remaining present after warning to disperse); § 415
(Disturbing the peace); § 417 (Drawing or exhibiting firearm); §§ 447, 447(a),
448(a) (Arson); § 459 (Burglary); §§ 484-485 (Theft); § 594 (Malicious mischief).
Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code § 1600 (Curfew) was invoked many times. See generally, Klein,
Ogren & Thomas, Watts 1965: Arrests & Trials: Analysis & Statistics, 3 LAW IN
TRANs. Q. 177, 182-183, 187.
18 Klein, Ogren & Thomas, supra note 17, at 179, 188. Cal. Pen. Code §§ 404, 407,

and 409 accounted for 53 convictions in the Municipal Courts of Los Angeles and
were among 828 cases completed as of January 20, 1966.
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ing that although there was no evidence of the use of force or violence, "there was a disturbance of the public peace, and conduct on
[defendants'] part, which indicated threats to use force or violence.""' In People v. Bundte, the court appeared to go even further
by holding that the mere inciting of a riot would be punishable under
section 404, though, apparently, an actual riot must have in fact
resulted.
Regarding the guilt of all who participate in, or who promote or
encourage, a riot, it is said in 8 Ruling Case Law, page 331, section
361, supported by authorities, that: ". . . All who encourage, incite, promote or take part in a riot are guilty of riot as principals;
and a person, to be guilty as a rioter, need not be actively engaged,
but if present giving support, countenance, etc., it is sufficient; but
20
mere presence alone is not sufficient to constitute one a rioter."
The court in Bundte also found that, "It was not necessary that a
previous agreement between the aggressors should have been alleged,
or have existed, to bring such offenses within the inhibitions of section 404."21
Thus, section 404, as construed in Dunn, would make punishable a
threat to use force or violence even though the force or violence was
never perpetrated, and under Bundte, section 404 would punish anyone who incited or promoted a riot, even though he did not actively
take part in the actual force or violence, and regardless of whether a
conspiracy between two or more aggressors had taken place. The
essential difference between section 404 and section 404.6 is that
culpability for inciting to riot, under section 404, would appear to
arise only if a riot actually followed. Section 404.6, on the other hand,
would proscribe the mere act of urging a riot, and the fact that a riot
did or did not occur would be irrelevant. Moreover, it must be noted
that section 404 is restricted in application to two or more persons
acting together, whereas section 404.6 would allow the prosecution of
one person who singlehandedly urges a riot.
B. Section 406-Rout
Section 406 provides that, "Whenever two or more persons, assembled and acting together, make any attempt or advance toward
the commission of an act which would be a riot if actually committed,
19 1 Cal. App. 2d 556, 559, 36 P.2d 1096, 1097 (1934).
20 87 Cal. App. 2d 735, 740, 197 P.2d 823, 830-31 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
915 (1949).
21 Id. at 743, 197 P.2d at 829.
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such assembly is a rout." A rout, which is essentially an attempt to
commit a riot, requires the presence of a specific intent to riot and a
situation which ultimately falls short of actual riot. Thus, if two or
more persons, having the intent to riot, commit an act which threatens
22
further acts of force or violence, they could be guilty of rout.

In contrast, section 404.6 provides that if one person, with the
intent to cause a riot, does an act which urges a riot, under circumstances which produce a clear and present and immediate danger of
acts of force or violence, he would be guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 406 is restricted in that it requires "two to threaten"; however,
section 404.6, while requiring only "one to urge," is somewhat
limited in that it also requires circumstances which produce a clear
and present and immediate danger. Thus, it might be argued that
the only real advantage which section 404.6 enjoys over section 406
lies in the fact that it precludes the necessity for finding more than
one party to the crime.
Although the following two Penal Code sections cannot be analytically compared with section 404.6, the provisions therein do
reflect the extent to which the legislature has attempted to insure the
public peace.
C. Section 407-Unlawful Assembly
Section 407 provides that, "Whenever two or more persons
assemble together to do any unlawful act, and separate without doing
or advancing toward it, or do a lawful act in a violent, boisterous, or
tumultuous manner, such assembly is an unlawful assembly." The apparent requirement-that before there can be an unlawful assembly
those who assembled to do an unlawful act must separate without
doing or advancing toward it-has not always been afforded a literal
interpretation by the California Supreme Court. In Coverstone v.
Davis,23 a group of students had gathered together for the purpose of
viewing an unlawful "hot-rod" race. The court held that assembling
for this illegal purpose rendered the actions of the individuals
knowingly participating therein an unlawful assembly within the
meaning of section 407. However, lest the words "knowingly participating therein" be interpreted as requiring an intent to assemble
22 See People v. Judson, 11 Daly 1, 83 (New York City Ct. C.P. 1849). "A rout
differs from a riot in that the persons do not actually execute their purpose, but only
make some motion towards its execution; . . ." 54 C.J. RIOT § 2 (1931); Common.
wealth v. Duitch, 165 Pa. Super. 187, 190, 67 A.2d 821, 822 (1949).
2 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 840 (1952).
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unlawfully, the general rule appears to be that, "the time when the
intent is formed is immaterial. In fact it is not necessary that a specific intent of any sort exist in the minds of the persons assembled in
' 24
order to constitute the offense.
A holding similar to Coverstone was reached in In re Bacon. There,
the First District Court of Appeal sustained a conviction of unlawful
assembly against a group of minors who staged a "sit-in" demonstration at the University of California. The court stated:
[An] unlawful assembly occurred . . . when the group of protesters knowingly remained in Sproul Hall after it became dosed
to the public and after having been warned to leave by the custodian of the building. The record is dear 2that
appellants were
5
present at the place of an unlawful assembly.
The construction placed upon section 407 by the courts in Coverstone and Bacon makes the section more effective in application than
its wording would indicate.
D. Section 409-Riot, Rout or Unlawful Assembly;
Remaining Present After Warning To Disperse
Section 409 provides that, "Every person remaining present at the
place of any riot, rout, or unlawful assembly, after the same has been
lawfully warned to disperse, except public officers and persons assisting them in attempting to disperse the same, is guilty of a misdemeanor." Though applicable only after the commission of some
other criminal act, this section allows the police to reinstate the public peace and to prevent further breaches of the peace by requiring
those present without a valid reason or purpose to disperse from the
scene of the public disorder.
In re Bacon also dispelled the idea that prosecutions for violation
of section 409 required participation by the accused in the original
criminal offense. There, a police officer had ordered the students to
disperse after the custodian had asked them to leave, and the court,
in finding a violation of section 409, stated, "Accordingly, if they
did not disperse after the assembly was lawfully warned to disperse
appellants were in violation of section 409 even though they may not
have participated in the assembly. '2 6 Hence, to successfully prosecute
violators of section 409, the defendant need not be shown to have par24 43 CAL. JUR. 2d Unlawful Assembly § 10 (1966).

25 240 Adv. Cal. App. 34, 50, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322, 331 (1966).
28 Id. at 49-50, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
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ticipated in an unlawful assembly so long as he remained at the scene
of the public disorder after having been lawfully warned to disperse.
The words "lawfully warned to disperse" were interpreted in People
v.Sklar to provide that, "a violation of § 409 cannot occur until the
command mentioned in § 72627 has been given .... The list of officers
who are authorized by § 726 to give this command... may be held
by construction to include the police." 28 Accordingly, it may be noted
that section 409 would punish anyone who failed to disperse, and
that the section would also protect innocent bystanders from oppressive conduct on the part of police officers. However, after the
warning has been given, the police need not declare their intention
to make an arrest before they actually do S0.29
In re Bacon is also noteworthy in that section 409 was subjected
to two constitutional attacks by the protesters-appellants. Appellants
contended that section 409 violated due process of law as guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because it was stated in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. 0
In rejecting this contention, the court stated that section 409 "uses
language which is clear and unambiguous."8 1 The appellants' second
contention-that section 409 deprived them of their rights of free
speech, assembly, and petition for redress of grievances-was based
upon the decision in Cox v. Louisiana.2 The court, however, concluded that the reliance on Cox was misplaced, pointing out that the
statute under attack, as opposed to the statute in Cox, was reason27 CAL. PEN. CODE §

726 provides:

Where any number of persons .. .are unlawfully or riotously assembled,

the sheriff of the county and his deputies, the officials governing the town or
city, or the judges of the justice courts and constables thereof, or any of them,
must go among the persons assembled, or as near to them as possible, and
command them, in the name of the State, immediately to disperse.
28 111 Cal. App. 776, 778, 292 Pac. 1068 (1930).
29 People v. Anderson, 117 Cal. App. 763, 772, 1 P.2d 64, 68 (1931). Where a
speaker committed a misdemeanor in the presence of officers by refusing to move on,
the officers could arrest the speaker without a warrant or a previous declaration of
their intention to do so, although the speaker's listeners and not the speaker were
blocking traffic.
30 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948); Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ; Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ;
In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 792, 350 P.2d 116, 120, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364, 368 (1960);
People v. McCaughan, 49 Cal. 2d 409, 414, 317 P.2d 974, 978 (1957).
31 240 Adv. Cal. App. at 56, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
82 Cox v. Louisiana [Cox I-No. 24, 1964 Term], 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Cox v.
Louisiana [Cox II-No. 49, 1964 Term], 379 U.S. 559 (1965). See notes 55, 58 infra
and accompanying text.
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ably clear as to the proscribed conduct, and that the interest in protecting property outweighed appellants' constitutional right of free
assembly.
In the light of the principles declared in Cox, and the many
decisions therein cited, we are led to the conclusion that although
appellants undoubtedly possessed the constitutional right to express
their grievances, these constitutional rights did not abrogate appellants' duty to refrain from violating laws of our state which are
dear as to the conduct which they prohibit, which reasonably provide for the protection of the public and of public property and
which are not arbitrarily applied by the authorities. 3

The conclusion which may be drawn from the Baton court's statements is that the protection of society, as provided for by section 409,
takes precedence over the rights of individuals. This is true because
section 409 is clear as to the conduct it prohibits, and because it is
not subject to arbitrary application.
E. Effectiveness of Sections 404, 406, 407, and 409

The four Penal Code sections that have been examined illustrate
that California did have laws relating to the preservation of the
public peace before the enactment of section 404.6. Case decisions
indicate that each section has been generally effective against the act
or conduct which it proscribes.3 4 However, sections 404, 406, and 407
are restricted in that all three require that two or more persons either
be actively participating in, or be promoting, encouraging, or inciting
the conduct before it becomes unlawful. Although section 409 may be
invoked against only one individual if he fails to disperse, it is applicable only after an actual riot, rout, or unlawful assembly has
occurred. Thus, if there existed an inadequacy in the above Penal
Code sections, which necessitated the enactment of section 404.6, that
inadequacy would have been those sections' restricted applicability to
two or more persons.
Section 404.6 was earlier described as an aggressive measure designed to prevent the eruption of force or violence. Its aggressiveness,
in part, is inherent in the wording "every person," which proscribes
one individual, acting alone, from committing an act which urges
others to riot.
33 240 Adv. Cal. App. at 58, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
34 Rees v. City of Palm Springs, 188 Cal. App. 2d 339, 344, 10 Cal. Rptr. 386, 390

(1961) (dictum).
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IH. THE ELEMENTS OF SECTION 404.6-URGING TO RIOT
Every person who with the intent to cause a riot does an act or
engages in conduct which urges a riot, or urges others to commit
acts of force or violence, or the burning or destroying of property,
and at a time and place and under circumstances which produce
a dear and present and immediate danger of acts of force or
violence or the burning or destroying of property, is guilty of a
misdemeanor. .... 35

Section 404.6 consists of three elements: (1) the intent to cause
a riot; (2) an act or conduct which urges a riot; and (3)

a time and

place and circumstances which produce a clear and present and immediate danger. So that the effectiveness of section 404.6 may be
evaluated, each of the constituent elements must be individually
analyzed. The validity of possible constitutional attacks against the
individual elements and the section as a whole will be important to
the analyses.
A. The First Element
The first element of section 404.6 requires a specific intent, i.e.,
the "intent to cause a riot." This specific intent should be distinguished from an "intent to riot," for it would appear that one could
intend to participate in a riot without intending to cause a riot. Consequently, the first element is restrictive in that the mere intent to
participate in a riot is not culpable under section 404.6. The specific
intent requirement would also appear to be antithetical to the corresponding requirement in section 407 (as an example) wherein
"knowingly" participating in an assembly for an unlawful purpose is
deemed criminal, regardless of the presence or absence of a specific
intent to participate in the assembly. The mere realization by the
accused that he was part of this assembly would be sufficient to bring
him within the prohibitions of section 407. Section 404.6 cannot be
so broadly applied.
The "intent to cause a riot" requirement also sets section 404.6
apart from section 404, which does not require an intent to riot but
35 CAL. PEN. CODE § 404.6, para. 2, is outside the scope of this note. It provides:

This section shall not apply to, nor in any way affect, restrain, or interfere
with, otherwise lawful activity engaged in by or on behalf of a labor organiza-

tion or organizations by its members, agents, or employees.
Los Angeles Municipal Court, Cases 752342 and 752343 (Nov. 21, 1966), in 44

Metropolitan News (Los Angeles) No. 212, p. 1, col. 2, at 8, col. 1 (Nov. 23, 1966)
(para. 2 is mere surplusage; it does not exclude labor from the provisions of section
404.6 and thus does not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Con.
stitution or the prohibitions against the granting of special privileges and immunities

of the California Constitution).
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only a general mens rea. Thus, under section 404 if two or more persons possessing the "intent to assault" other persons commit acts of
force or violence which disturb the public peace, they are guilty of
riot, even though they do not possess the intent to riot.
The insertion of the specific intent requirement as the first element
of section 404.6 appears to be somewhat anomalous when aligned
with the parent section-404-which has no such requirement. The
anomaly is possibly due to the fact that section 404.6, unlike section
404, can be invoked against one individual; consequently, greater
protection is to be afforded a defendant prosecuted under section
404.6. Unquestionably, the burden of proving a specific intent is more
exacting than that of a general mens rea. However, if the specific
intent requirement was inserted to protect the defendant, its insertion
is incongruous with the purpose of section 404.6 to prevent one individual, acting alone, from urging others to riot.
B. The Second Element
The second element of section 404.6 is an "act or conduct which
urges a riot, or urges others to commit acts of force or violence, or
the burning or destroying of property." An understanding of the
second element can be achieved only by properly interpreting the
word "urges" within its context. When section 404.6 was first introduced in the California Legislature, 1966 First Extraordinary Session,
as Assembly Bill No. 201 it was entitled: "An act . . . relating to
incitement to riot... " Since this title was retained in West's Penal
Code,3 6 it might be inferred that the words "urges" and "incites" were
meant to be interchangeable. If one inserts "incites" for "urges," the
second element would then consist of an act or conduct "which incites
a riot, or incites others to commit acts of force or violence, or the
burning or destroying of property."
Nevertheless, this interchange does little by way of explicitly defining the verb, "to urge," since there were no prior California statutes which used the word "incite." Furthermore, the only reported
California case 7 which used "incite" used it in a wholly different context. There is only a handful of reported decisions in other jurisdic36 Cal. Pen. Code § 404.6 is entitled "Incitement to riot" in West's Cal. Pen. Code
(Supp. 1966) but is entitled "Urging to riot, or burning or destroying of property" in
Deering's Cal. Pen. Code (Supp. 1966). Section 404.6 is commonly referred to as an
inciting to riot statute, but the actual wording is "urges" and not "incites."
37 Piluso v. Spencer, 36 Cal. App. 416, 418, 172 Pac. 412, 414 (1918). In an action
for violation of the "personal rights" of the plaintiff brought under Cal. Civ. Code
§ 52, plaintiff alleged defendant had incited innkeeper to eject plaintiff.
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tions which utilized "incite" in the same context as section 404.6; and
one court which attempted to define incitement to riot merely inserted
"lead" or "urge" for the word "incite. ' 38 Finding no apparent solace
in equating "incites" with "urges," attention must be directed elsewhere in order to elucidate the meaning of this second element.
The Merriam-Webster Third New InternationalDictionary definition of 'urge" includes, inter alia, "solicit or entreat earnestly." Perhaps then, the second element of section 404.6 might best be
interpreted by drawing an analogy to the substantive crime of solicitation. In State v. Blechman, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in
commenting upon solicitation, stated: "At common law, it is a misdemeanor for one to counsel, incite or solicit another to commit either
a felony or a misdemeanor.. . even though the solicitation is of no
effect, and the crime counselled is not committed. The gist of the
offense is the solicitation." 9 It may be argued that the counselling,
inciting, or soliciting, as enumerated by the New Jersey court, encompasses essentially the same type of conduct which is intended to
be reached by the second element of section 404.6. However, unless
the verb "to urge" is precisely defined to mean "to incite" or "to
solicit," the conduct proscribed by the second element of section
404.6 would remain somewhat vague and unclear. The second element would then be subject to a constitutional attack on the ground
of vagueness. 40 Due to the possible vagueness of the second element
the question may be posed whether the California Legislature should
have enacted a "solicitation to riot" section in its attempt to devise a
method for preserving the public peace.
The argument for a "solicitation to riot" section, as opposed to the
"urging to riot" offense defined by section 404.6, has several bases.
First, the crime of solicitation resembles the common law crimes
of riot and inciting to riot which had no specific intent requirement.
Second, Penal Code section 653 (f) already makes the solicitation of
crimes such as murder, robbery, burglary, grand theft, and rape a
crime in itself. Section 653 (f) could possibly be expanded to proscribe solicitation to riot, or more appropriately, an entirely new
section might be inserted in the Penal Code under Title II, Crimes
Against the Peace. Third, under a "solicitation to riot" section, every
38 Commonwealth v. Hayes, 205 Pa. Super. 338, 209 A.2d 38, 39 (1965).
39 135 N.J.L. 99, 50 A.2d 152, 154 (1946); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 78 (1961).
"Solicitation . . .may consist of any conduct conveying the idea of an invitation to
commit a crime."

40 See cases cited note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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person who solicits another to riot could be prosecuted even though
the solicitation was of no effect. 41 If a riot actually erupted, every
person who had solicited others to riot could be prosecuted for riot
as a principal. 42 Fourth, whereas section 404.6 is intended to be
applied to explosive situations involving the inciting of large groups
or crowds, the "solicitation to riot" section could have broader effect
in that it could be applied to much smaller groups in comparatively
tranquil situations. Fifth, "solicitation," because it is a common law
crime, would be less vulnerable to a constitutional attack for vagueness than section 404.6 which utilizes the word "urges," the word
in itself being relatively undefined and unknown both to the common
43
law and recent case law.

In addition to the problem of interpreting the word "urges," the
second element presents another matter for consideration. The element consists of an "act or conduct which urges a riot," and ostensibly, this act or conduct could be any overt manifestation, including
spoken or written words. 44 If the second element could be interpreted

to include with its provisions "speech which urges a riot," section
404.6, in its entirety, might well be viewed as an attempt by the state
to restrict the freedom of speech. This attempt must necessarily be
considered in light of the constitutional guarantees enumerated in
the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitu41 People v. Burt, 45 Cal. 2d 311, 288 P.2d 503 (1955). "[T~he crime ...
does
not require the commission of any overt art [act?]. It is complete when the solicitation
is made, and it is immaterial that the object of the solicitation is never consummated, or
that no steps are taken towards its consummation ...." Id. at 314, 288 P.2d at 505. See
People v. Haley, 102 Cal. App. 2d 159, 165, 227 P.2d 48, 51 (1951); People v. Gray,
52 Cal. App. 2d 620, 653, 127 P.2d 72, 90 (1942).
42 14 CAL. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 39 (1954). A person who solicits the commission of a crime, which is actually committed, is liable as a principal under Cal. Pen.
Code § 31 which provides:
All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be a felony
or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the
offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised
and encouraged its commission. .. are principals in any crime so committed.
43 Los Angeles Municipal Court, Cases 752342 and 752343 (Nov. 21, 1966), in 44
Metropolitan News (Los Angeles) No. 212, p. 1, col. 2, at 8, col. I (Nov. 23, 1966),
held that:
Paragraph one [of Cal. Pen. Code § 404.6] is a lawful exercise of the
police power and is not an unconstitutional deprivation of the rights of free
speech, or assembly....
The section is not unconstitutionally vague nor uncertain. The verb "urges"
may be defined "to present in an earnest or pressing manner; insist upon;
advocate; demand; to exhort; to goad." The law is by its terms reasonably
clear of meaning.
44 See, e.g., State v. Cole, 249 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.2d 732, 742 (1959); 77 CJ.S.
RIoT § 1 (1952); Commonwealth v. Apriceno, 131 Pa. Super. 158, 198 AtL 515, 517
(1938).
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tion. Thus, the California Legislature was undoubtedly confronted
with a constitutional problem in drafting the second element of section 404.6. Essentially, this problem was to proscribe acts or conduct,
which may consist of speech, while at the same time avoiding unconstitutional restrictions on the exercise of that speech. In searching for
appropriate guidelines, the legislature very likely resorted to recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Perhaps the most influential decision was that of Terminiello v.
Chicago.45 Terminiello had spoken at a meeting under the auspices of
the Christian Veterans of America. A crowd of several hundred
persons had gathered outside the auditorium to protest the meeting.
Upon leaving the auditorium Terminiello criticized various political
groups, and his speech, which included anti-Jewish epithets, provoked
from the crowd expressions of immediate anger, unrest, and alarm.
At trial the jury was instructed that it might find Terminiello guilty
of disorderly conduct if his behavior was of the type that "stirs the
public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest,
or creates a disturbance.""4 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed
his conviction by finding that the ordinance,47 as construed by the trial
court, invaded the province of free speech. In holding that even
the most provocative speech should be constitutionally protected,
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, argued that restrictions
should not be placed on the freedom of speech unless the speech
produces a dear and present danger of a serious substantive evil.
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is
to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it

induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even. stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions
and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of
an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute . . .
is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless
shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evilt48] that rises far above public inconvenience, annoy45 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
46
47

Id. at 1.

Id. at 2. The ordinance provided: "All persons who shall make, aid, countenance
or assist in making any improper noise, riot, disturbance of the peace . . . shall be
deemed guilty of disorderly conduct." CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODr § 193-1
(1939).
48 Justice Holmes first espoused the clear and present danger test in diclum in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), when the Court upheld a conviction of
conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 217, 219. Speaking
for the Court, 249 U.S. at 51-52, Justice Holmes stated:
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ance or unrest. .

.

.There is no room under our Constitution for

a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas, either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political
or community groups.4 9
The conclusions drawn by Justice Douglas are clear. First, the
freedom of speech is reaffirmed as a basic and fundamental freedom.
Second, though this freedom is not absolute, any legislative attempt
to restrict the freedom of speech must be couched in terms that show,
on their face, that the speech sought to be restricted would "likely
produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil."
When the proscribed act or conduct consists of speech, the second
element of section 404.6 would appear to be a restriction on the
freedom of speech.

C. The Third Element
As Justice Douglas noted in Terminiello, the constitutional protection of speech does not extend to speech which is likely to produce
a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil. Accordingly,
the California Legislature set about to qualify the first two elements
of section 404.6 by requiring that the intent to cause a riot and the
act or conduct accompanying that intent occur "at a time and place
under circumstances which produce a clear and present and immediate danger of acts of force or violence or the burning or destroying
of property." Nevertheless, Justice Douglas' qualification on the freedom of speech is substantially different from the qualification set
forth by the California Legislature. The Terminiello qualification on
free speech is predicated on the speech, itself, rather than the circumstances. But, in the third element of section 404.6 the legislature has
provided that the circumstances,alone, can give rise to the "dear and
present danger." The argument that follows will point out the constitutional impact of section 404.6's "dear and present danger" test.
While the third element of section 404.6 may be divided into three
basic phrases,50 in light of the Terminiello decision it would appear
[The] character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is
done.... The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even
protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that have all the
effect of force. . . .The question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
49 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. at 4-5. (Emphasis added.)
50 The three phrases of the third element are: (1) "at a time and place and under

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 4

that the "dear and present and immediate danger" phrase was intended by the legislature to be the focal point in the third element.
It is well to note that the word "immediate" has been added to the
traditional "clear and present danger" phrase, but it should probably
be ignored as being redundant. " The first phrase of the third element-"at a time and place and under circumstances which produce"
-and the third phrase-"of acts of force or violence or the burning
or destroying of property"-define the conditions under which the
"dear and present and immediate danger" test is to take effect. More
precisely, the first phrase suggests that the time, the place, and the
existent circumstances in and of themselves are to create the danger
which is so "clear and present and immediate" that it warrants a
restriction on the freedom of speech. Likewise, the third phrase defines the requisite "serious substantive evil," which Terminiello required be imminent before the restriction could be imposed. Clearly,
these "acts of force or violence or the burning or destroying of
property" constitute a "serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest."
Considering each of the three phrases separately raises no particular constitutional objection. However, conceding that the third
element of section 404.6 represents a good faith attempt on the part
of the legislature to adhere to the constitutional guidelines as set
out in Terminiello, the three phrases when read together appear to
contain an inherent defect, rendering the entire statute unconstitutional. The "dear and present danger" test as originally promulgated
by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States permits the restriction of free speech only if "the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger."' 2 The wording of the third element of section 404.6, however, would permit the restriction of speech if the time, the place,
and the circumstances, as opposed to the speech, itself, create the
circumstances which produce" (2) "a dear and present and immediate danger" (3) "of
acts of force or violence or the burning or destroying of property."
51 The writer contends that the word "immediate" is redundant of the word "immi-

nent," which has been an element of the clear and present danger test since Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)

(Brandeis, J., concurring). See note 52 infra.

52 249 U.S. at 52. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 373, 377 wherein Justice
Brandeis declared:
That the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does not exist unless
speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger
of some substantive evil which the State constitutionally may seek to prevent

has been settled.. . . [N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear
and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that
it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.
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necessary danger. Therefore, the writer contends that the entire third
element, which makes the circumstances rather than the speech the
creator of the clear and present danger, would be unconstitutional in
light of the Terminiello decision. Furthermore, since the third element is inextricably connected with the other two elements of section
404.6, the entire statute is vulnerable to constitutional attack.
The writer would argue also that the statute is unconstitutional
on another ground. By virtue of the due process -clause of the federal
constitution, a statute will succumb to a constitutional attack if it is
overly broad in scope.53 It is submitted that the language in the third
element in section 404.6 lies within this constitutional prohibition.
A recent case in which a disturbing the peace statute was declared
5 4 In that case
unconstitutionally broad in scope is Cox v. Louisiana.
the defendant, Cox, had led a civil rights' demonstration protesting
segregation. The demonstration was prompted by the arrest and
imprisonment of twenty-three Negro students, who had picketed
stores maintaining segregated lunch counters. At the conclusion of
the demonstration, Cox had exhorted his followers to engage in
"sit-ins" in segregated restaurants. Cox was arrested and charged
with four offenses under Louisiana law-criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a
courthouse. He was acquitted of criminal conspiracy but convicted of
the other offenses.
In Cox I, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Goldberg, reversed the disturbing the peace conviction upon the ground that the
statute,55 as interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, was unconstitutionally broad in scope. Justice Goldberg ruled that if the statute
53 A statute is subject to attack for being overly broad (overbreadth)
if it sweeps
within its ambit constitutionally protected behavior. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940) (statute void on its face for prohibiting going near business premises with intent to publicize labor dispute or persuade others not to trade with the
business); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-307 (1940); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965), notes 54-55, 58 infra and accompanying text; Sperber & Solomon,
Preserving the Peace: Vagueness, Overbreadth and Free Speech, 3 LAw IN TRANs Q.

161.

[Cox I], 379 U.S. 536.
55 Id. at 544. The statute provided:
Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby... crowds
54

or congregates with others ...

in or upon ...

a public street or public high-

way, or upon a public sidewalk, or any other public place or building ...
and who fails or refuses to disperse and move on. . . . when ordered so to do
by any law enforcement officer . . . shall be guilty of disturbing the peace.
LA. REv. STAT. § 14:103.1 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
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swept within its scope constitutionally free speech and assembly, then
that statute must fall.
The statutory crime 56] consists of two elements: (1) congregating
with others "with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under
circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned ..
" While the second part of this offense is narrow and
specific, the first element is not.... [It] would allow persons to be
punished for peacefully expressing unpopular views.... Therefore,
as in Terminiello and Edwards5 7 the conviction under this statute
must be reversed as the statute is unconstitutional in that it sweeps
within its broad scope activities that are constitutionally free speech
and assembly....,,58

In Cox 11, after reversing the conviction of picketing before a
courthouse, Justice Goldberg reiterated the proper relationship between free speech and the statutes which would restrict it.
Nothing we have said here.., is to be interpreted as sanctioning
riotous conduct in any form or demonstrations, however peaceful
their conduct or commendable their motives, which conflict with
properly drawn statutes and ordinances designed to promote law
and order, [and to] protect the community against disorder ...
We reaffirm the repeated holdings of this Court that our constitutional command of free speech and assembly is basic and fundamental and encompasses peaceful social protest, so important to the
preservation of the freedoms treasured in a democratic society. We
also reaffirm that there is no place for violence in a democratic
society dedicated to liberty under law, and that the right of peaceful
protest does not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may do so at any time and at any place. There is a proper time
and place for even the most peaceful protest and a plain duty and
responsibility on the part of all citizens to obey all valid laws and
regulations. There is an equally plain requirement for laws and
regulations to be drawn so as to give citizens fair warning as to
what is illegal; for regulations of conduct that involves freedom of
speech and assembly not to be so broad in scope as to stifle First
Amendment freedoms, which "need breathing room to survive,"
NAACP v. Burton, 371 U.S. 415, 433; for appropriate limitations
on the discretion of public officials where speech and assembly are
intertwined with regulated conduct .... We believe that all of these
requirements can be met in an ordered society dedicated to liberty. ....59
56 Ibid.

57 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (breach of the peace statute overly broad as construed and
thereby infringed upon constitutionally protected rights of speech, assembly, and redress
of grievances).
58

Cox v. Louisiana [Cox I], 379 U.S. at 551.
379 U.S. at 574.

59 Cox v. Louisiana [Cox II],
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While reaffirming the basic and fundamental right of free speech,
Justice Goldberg also reaffirmed the right of society to function free
from violence. The conflict arises when these two rights clash. The
resolution of this conflict, in Justice Goldberg's view, lies in having
the citizen abide by all "valid laws and regulations." To determine
the validity of the law, he offers three criteria: (1) the law must
give fair warning as to what is illegal; (2) it must not be overly
broad in scope; and (3) it must place appropriate limitations on the
discretion of public officials especially where speech and assembly are
inextricably connected with the regulated conduct.
While section 404.6 might be subject to attack on each of these
three criteria, for the sake of brevity the writer subjects only the
third element to constitutional attack, and then only upon the second
and third of Justice Goldberg's criteria. The decision rendered by the
Second District Court of Appeal in People v. Huss 0 suggests that
section 404.6 might be judged unconstitutionally broad in scope if
applied against persons merely espousing an unpopular view, albeit
under circumstances which produce a dear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil. The Huss decision also indicates that section
404.6 would be declared unconstitutional in that it places no appropriate restrictions upon the discretion of public officials. In Huss, five
members of the American Nazi Party were convicted of conspiracy to
riot and assault. Dressed in Nazi uniforms with swastika armbands
and steel helmets, they had picketed a celebration of the fifteenth
anniversary of Israel. They carried placards mounted on poles some
of which read: "Zionism is Treason"; "85% of the Atom Spies were
Radical Jews"; "Sig Heil, UAR." The celebrants were mostly Jewish,
and as the Nazis passed through the crowd, fighting broke out and
general disorder ensued. Under these facts, the writer contends that a
clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil existed.
On appeal, the defendants, relying on the Terminiello decision,
argued that the trial court's instructions allowed the jury to find a
conspiracy to riot if defendants knew their signs would tend to arouse
or inflame the Jewish celebrants. The appellate court noted that
notwithstanding the provocative nature of the picketing, such picketing cannot be constitutionally restricted simply because it might invite dispute.
We think the existence of a constitutional right to speak, demonstrate, and picket on behalf of causes known to be highly offensive
60241

Adv. Cal. App. 455, 51 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1966).
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to those picketed was settled in Terminiello, where the court upheld
such a right in sweeping terms and ruled under the First Amendment it cannot be made an offense merely to invite dispute, or to
bring about a condition of unrest.6 1
Thus, it would appear that the Terminiello decision is being applied
in full force in California, and that speech will be afforded protection
even though "known to be highly offensive." Likewise, the Terminiello and Huss decisions appear to be in substantial agreement on
several points. First, the constitutionally protected speech which invited dispute and brought about a condition of unrest actually culminated in physical force and violence. Second, the acts of force
and
violence in both cases would appear to be a serious substantive evil
of which there was a clear and present danger. Third, it would seem
that if both courts had found that the speech, itself, had produced
the clear and present danger, the convictions would have been upheld. Apparently then, the logical conclusion to be drawn from the
Terminiello and Huss decisions is that the circumstances rather than
the speech created the clear and present danger, and that a clear and
present danger created solely by the circumstances does not permit
statutory restrictions on the freedom of speech. Therefore, this writer
submits that section 404.6 would be declared unconstitutionally
broad in scope if applied in a Terminiello-Huss-type situation, because section 404.6, like the statute in Cox I, would "allow persons
to be punished for peacefully expressing unpopular views. 0' 2
However, the reversal in Huss is the more noteworthy because the
court found that the defendants' speech, i.e., picketing, served no
laudable purpose, but that the real motive for defendants' conduct
was "mischief-making and quarrelsomeness." 63 The court, by its
own admission, had some difficulty in connecting the defendants'
speech with the laudable aspects of free speech, such speech traditionally having been involved with attempts to broaden civil rights
and to secure equal treatment for different races. The court resolved
its own difficulty by looking upon speech "as a tool that is neutral,
good or bad according to its use .... "0 4 But, in restricting this "bad
speech" the court found two formidable and inherent difficulties.
The court's learned discussion of these two difficulties and the conclusion it draws will probably be the basis for the California courts
to declare section 404.6 unconstitutional. The Huss court stated:
61
62
note
63

Id. at 470, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 59-60.

Cox v. Louisiana [Cox I], 379 U.S. at 551. See discussion in text accompanying

58 supra.
People v. Huss, 241 Adv. Cal. App. at 461, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
64 Ibid.
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One difficulty is that of boundaries-how [to?] determine what
advocacy is permissible dissent and what is pernicious mischief beyond the pale.... In an attempt to suppress subversive, pernicious,
and antisocial doctrines inevitably we find ourselves enmeshed in
the task of establishing the boundaries for orthodox thought and
drawing the line between the thinkable and the unthinkable.
The second difficulty is that of censors. Who is to make the determination? Courts? Juries? Legislators? Police? Prevailing public
opinion? Who has the final say when censors disagree? ...
Because of the difficulties in defining orthodoxy and determining
who shall define it, it has always seemed preferable in the normal
operation of our democratic society to put up with a considerable
amount of bad speech in public places from demagogues and psychopaths rather than undertake to regulate the content of speech
and determine which slogans and doctrines will be allowed the
freedom of the market place. Speech is free under the First Amendment, not so much because free speech is inherently good as because
its suppression is inherently bad. In the American garden we let a
hundred flowers bloom, knowing that among them may be skunkweed and thistle, dandelion and poison oak. For us excess of speech
involves a lesser evil than does restriction on its exercise. In our
Eden, Satan and the Archangel Gabriel may both be heard. 65
Although the court in the Huss case was directing its remarks
toward a conspiracy to riot conviction, those remarks would be equally
appropriate to a conviction under section 404.6. First, what are the
prescribed boundaries of section 404.6? It might be argued that the
"boundaries" of section 404.6 are prescribed by the "clear and present
and immediate danger" test, but the writer has shown that section
404.6 would misapply that test and would consequently unduly
restrict constitutionally protected speech. Therefore, section 404.6
would be unconstitutional under Justice Goldberg's second criteriaa valid law is not overly broad in scope. Second, who are the "censors"? The only answer is the police, who, before making an arrest,
would have to determine whether or not the speech should be restricted. Section 404.6 attempts to limit police discretion by requiring
that the time, the place, and the circumstances be of such a nature as
to create a clear and present and immediate danger. However, such
a limitation is inappropriate in that it would allow the police to restrict the freedom of speech even though the speech itself did not
create the clear and present and immediate danger. By the same
token, it would appear that the police could arbitrarily determine
that the time, the place, and the circumstances warrant the restriction
of the freedom of speech. Therefore, section 404.6 would be un65

Id. at 461-62, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 60-61.
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constitutional under Justice Goldberg's third criteria-a valid law
places appropriate limitations on the discretion of public officials.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Watts riots and the subsequent fear that riots might again
erupt led to the enactment of section 404.6. Section 404.6 is intended to bolster the preexisting law by allowing the police to arrest every individual who is "urging" acts that would disturb the
public peace. While the preservation of the public peace is a legitimate end, the means provided by section 404.6 appear to lack a
rational connection to that end due to vagueness, overbreadth, and
unlimited discretion in public officials. Unless the collective right of
society to exist free from violence is to completely overshadow the
individual's right of freedom of speech, section 404.6 should be
declared unconstitutional.
ROBERT

R. RoSn

